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ABSTRACT
International migration for employment has strongly influenced the
economic development of many countries. Much of the policy-oriented
research on the effects of migration has used the intellectual frameworks of
neoclassical economics to analyze changes in economic structure and output.
This paper reviews a broad sample of anthropological case studies of the
effects of migration on labor-sending communities in order to suggest ways
to broaden the economics frameworks. Focusing on the particular question of
how migrant remittances are used in the home communities, it explores the
significance of expenditures on education, land and agricultural improvements,
business investments, and traditional social activities including rituals.
The paper concludes that migrant expenditure decisions are influenced by
many factors which have not been incorporated into the economic models.
The economic analyses attempt to formulate generalized abstract models and
use empirical evidence to test them. The anthropological research aims to
interpret behavior in particular places, and would apply its theories across
cultures only as a heuristic device. The choice between frameworks depends
on the uses to which a particular study is to be put, and on the a priori
beliefs of the researcher about the existence and value of general theoretical
models of human behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Work in the field of international labor migration has stimulated much
discussion of how remittances and earnings brought home upon return affect
the sending countries. The impacts may be felt at many levels; by the
migrants' families, by their home villages, or in the regional or national
economy. The issues involved have been framed within -- and across -- a
number of disciplines, perhaps foremost among them economics, political
science, and anthropology. This paper looks at one particular question on
migrant remittances; whether, and under what circumstances, they are used for
economically productive investments. It is an attempt to cross disciplines,
asking how the data available from anthropological studies relate to the
theory suggested by economics. I am interested in two issues in making this
link. The first is the extent to which the empirical evidence substantiates or
refutes the theory, and thus suggests modifications in it. The second is
whether the individual case study data generated by anthropologists suggest
broader ways of framing the issues, which could give a fuller picture of the
determinants of migrant behavior.
The use of remittances for productive investments is important at two
levels. At a macroeconomic level, obviously, investment will lead to growth
of GNP, the standard indicator of economic development. At a micro level,
productive investments seem to offer a mechanism by which short-term
migration could provide long run benefits to people in the sending community.
While increased consumption by the household receiving remittances is
unquestionably good (at least within the framework of conventional economic
theory), it is only available for as long as the migrant remains abroad and
sends money home, or engages in cyclical patterns of migration. If, however,
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the foreign earnings can be channelled into something which will lead to
improved earning ability or increased security of income at home, then this
may be self-sustaining without repeat migration. It is therefore important to
see what kinds of investments are made by returned migrants (or the families
to which they send their earnings), the circumstances under which they are
possible, and the constraints which limit investment in many places.
The analysis of anthropological data in this paper is intended to
generate a broad picture of factors which affect migration investment
decisions. The outcome is not a detailed analysis of any one sending
country, but an overview of issues which are important in a number of
places, but which are not generally incorporated into economic models. This
overview provides a framework within which to consider an individual
country, in order to suggest the ways we may expect a strictly economic
analysis to be incomplete.
THEORY
Macro-economic theory suggests that migrant earnings could be integrated
into the sending economy in several ways.(1) Remittances constitute a
significant and, in a sense, exogenous increase in household income. This
could be saved by the migrants and channelled into productive investments
leading to growth of aggregate output. Moreover, migrants are paid in foreign
currency, which is often severely limited in labor-sending countries. If the
government could control currency exchanges and thus gain access to this
(1) In using the terms "sending economy," "sending community," and "sending
household," I will be referring throughout to the migrant's place of origin;
that is, to the piece sending migrants rather than to the place sending
remittances.
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resource, the currency could be used to ease bottlenecks on national
development; for example by permitting import of capital goods or raw
materials.
Alternately, remittances could be used by the receipient households to
increase consumption. The consequences of consumption increases are uncertain.
At the level of the household, they will obviously benefit the consumers. If
the sending households are at the low end of the income distribution, this
could be highly progressive. If the increased consumption is of domestically
produced goods, then it will serve as a stimulus to increased investment. to
the extent that the intermediate goods are also domestically manufactured,
this will lead to economic growth. However, if demand rises faster than the
ability of producers to increase supply, then the result will be inflation and
substitution of imported goods for domestic ones. The inflation in turn will
force more people to migrate, simply to maintain a constant standard of
living. Moreover, to the extent that the increased demand is for imported
goods it will not stimulate the domestic economy, but will lead to a
dependence on imports which could be a problem if migration slows down.
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
Aggregate data on the use of migrant remittances with which to answer
these questions are scarce. To the extent that they are available, they
suggest that the income is used most often for increases in household
consumption, purchases of land, and purchases or construction of housing.
Smaller amounts go to repayment of debts, education, health care, establishment
of small businesses, and so on.
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Suzanne Paine (1974, p. 133) has looked at the case of the Turkish
workers in Europe. She estimates that about 50% of migrant savings are
spent on consumption goods, including housing. She does not give figures for
the amount invested in producer goods, but reports that it is very low. This
is the case despite a Turkish government project to develop cooperative
agricultural investment schemes relying on savings from migrant remittances.
Paine attributes the failure of this project to lack of managerial expertise
among the returned migrants and to their unwillingness to put their earnings
into cooperative ventures.
Oberai and Singh (1980) have looked at uses of remittances by rural
households in the Indian Punjab. They found that most households were
increasing consumption, but only a few were putting anything into productive
investments or education (see table below). Of those making productive
investments, almost all were in agriculture. Unfortunately, the data from this
study provide only the number of households making each type of expenditure,
but not how much they spent.
Percent distribution of households by items on which
remittances were spent -- Indian Punjab
Item of Expenditure % of Households
1. Productive investment 6.1
2. Children's education 1.0
3. Debt repayment 3.8
4. Ceremonies (ncl.
weddings) 9.6
5. Food and clothing 75.9
6. Housing and household
goods (ncl. luxuries) 25.1
7. Consumption (4+5+6) 92.7
Source: Oberai and Singh 1980, p. 237
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Chandavarkar (1980) reviews a number of other studies which touch on
use of remittances, with much the same results. In a study of the Indian
state of Kerala, remittances went first to the repayment of debt; some sixty
percent of migrants owed money before they left. The preferred assets
among the Kerala migrants were land, buildings and jewelry, but the study
does not tell us how much money went towards them. Another study, this
one of remittances to Pakistan, found that the money was "frittered away in
personal consumption, social ceremonies, real estate and price escalating
trading."(1)
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES
Aggregate statistical approaches to the use of remittances are useful to
the extent that they provide some indication of macroeconomic data.
However, as a way of understanding the behavior of migrant households they
are limited because they do not allow us to observe or understand political
or cultural influences, and so do not help us understand causality or
motivations. For this reason, it is important to consider the evidence offered
by micro-level studies which place migrant behavior in a broader social
context and thus provide some insight into the actual determinants of
particular actions. Accordingly, I consider a range of case studies of the
impacts of migration on sending countries, looking at how migrants spend
their money, and seeking to understand the strategies underlying their
decisions in the face of varying constraints.
(1) Perwaiz, Shahid, "Home Remittances" Special Report, Pakistan Economist
September 1-7, 1979. Cited in Chandavarkar, 1980.
Page 7
As the aggregate economic data indicate, we observe three broad -- and
frequently overlapping -- patterns with respect to the use of remittances. In
all of the case studies they are used to increase consumption of everyday
items like food and household items, thus directly increasing standards of
living. In most places they are also used for "conspicuous consumption" of
goods which outsiders often judge not to contribute in essential ways to the
standard of living, but which clearly mark the consumer as a person of
wealth or high status. Usually, such status is conferred through a connection
with the world beyond the immediate village, for example by consumption of
western goods. However conspicuous consumption may also be understood to
include expenditures on rituals or social events which affirm status within the
indigenous social system. Although commonly used, the category of "conspicuous
consumption" is actually highly ambiguous, because many items so labelled
may also be understood as investments or stores of value. For example,
electrical appliances or transistor radios may be resold to raise quick cash;
and status in the home community may translate into marriage prospects for
one's children. The third pattern for use of remittances is what I loosely
term "investment," by which I mean any expenditures which can provide a
permanent improvement in the migrant's ability to make a living in the home
community.
The discussion which follows identifies the general areas in which
investments are or could be made. By comparing cases in which each occurs
and cases in which the studies specifically mention why such investments do
not occur, I draw general conclusions about some of the non-economic
factors determining migrant decisions.
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EDUCATION
In neo-classical economics, expenditures on education are understood as
investments in human capital, which will be made if the present discounted
value of expected increases in lifetime earnings exceeds the costs of the
education. The anthropological evidence suggests that economic concerns do
not play the major role in decisions about education. In fact, the only places
in which migrants' children were found to be educated were ones where
education was free, so it is hard to draw any conclusions about the value of
returns relative to costs. However, in at least one place young people opted
for education despite the fact that skilled white-collar jobs paid less than the
alternatives. This suggests that we must look beyond income incentives to
understand decisions about education.
Education plays an important role in the migration behavior of people
from the southwestern Iranian district of Larestan. (McIntire, 1982) Since the
1940s, Laris have been migrating to Kuwait and the other small oil-producing
states of the Gulf. Although some migrants were selling their labor, most
were operating small retail businesses which supplied the local population,
particularly other migrants, with food, clothing, housing, furnishings, and other
necessities. The pattern has involved stays in Kuwait of eighteen months to
three years or more, with visits back to Larestan of no more than six
months. However because of the cost of living and the Kuwaiti immigration
policies, few migrants bring their families or stay as permanent residents.
Instead, they support their families in Iran with remittances; McIntire reports
that by the 1970s these had become the "mainstay of the ... economy."
(Ibid, p. 20)
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In the 1940s and 1950s, few Lari families sent their sons to school for
more than a couple of years. Public schools in Larestan were few and
charged tuition, so instead of pursuing an education the boys migrated with
their fathers to learn the family business. In the 1960s, however, the Iranian
government instituted mandatory schooling, increased the number of schools,
and made them free. With these changes, boys began to stay in school
instead of migrating. Those who completed high school could find high status
white collar jobs as teachers, government servants, or clerks. These paid less
than work in Kuwait but were preferred to the migratory life -- both by the
boys themselves, and by girls who frequently would refuse marriage to
migrants in favor of husbands who would stay in Iran.
Since education in Larestan was free after the 1960s we cannot draw
clear conclusions about how it is valued in economic terms. Moreover,
without knowing the government's ability to enforce the mandatory schooling
law, we cannot determine the significance of the elimination of tuition and
increased availability of schools in the trend for boys to remain in Iran
rather than migrating. The evidence that they prefer to work for lower
salaries in Iran than to migrate - and perhaps more to the point, that women
prefer to marry non-migrants - is a clear reflection of the negative values
placed on migration. There is another dimension to this shift, however. The
white collar jobs frequently involve moving to a larger city, thus becoming a
more less permanent part of a different cultural group from the home
community. Thus instead of representing an investment which will improve
social position within the original culture, education becomes a decision to
move into a different cultural group altogether.
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Education was also found to be a vehicle for permanently leaving the
home community in a study of migration from the Adriatic coast of
Yugoslavia. (Bennett, 1979) The island of Brac and the coastal town of
Sutivan have been sources of migration for almost a hundred years. Since
the Second World War most of the migration has been to Yugoslavian cities
or to western Europe. By 1970 the migration patterns included a substantial
number of young people moving to Split, a nearby city of about 200,000, to
pursue their educations beyond the eight years required by the law. By and
large, migration to Split for education leads to permanent departures from the
home community. Some educated people residing in Split built second homes
in their home community, highlighting the change in their social situations
before and after migration. A few who returned did so to take on new
economic roles in the tourist industry which was growing in the coastal
towns. Like the second home construction, the emergence of this industry
indicates a major shift in the economic and social structure of the home
community.
This evidence suggests that in Yugoslavia, as in Iran, the role of
education cannot be understood simply in economic terms. Rather, at least in
these cases, investment in education places the educated person in a different
sector of society, and does not merely change his or her position within the
community or origin. Moreover, in both countries the choice of this strategy
must be understood as a (possibly unintended) consequence of deliberate
government policies which made education an option. In Iran this was a
decision to make education free, accessible, and mandatory. In Yugoslavia, it
was a result of the eight years of compulsory education and the development
of a higher education system which allows for considerable internal mobility.
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These two cases suggest that, in thinking about education, one must ask not
only whether it pays off in economic terms, but how government policy is
affecting its availability and viability as a route to social mobility.
Brettell's depiction of the experiences of northern Portuguese migrants to
the Paris region reinforces this point through contrast. (Brettell, 1979) She
describes the social structure of the sending commmunity as extremely rigid,
characterized by a sharp and largely inviolable distinction between lower and
upper classes. Within this structure, she finds that the educational system is
designed to offer a very high level of training to the few who can afford it,
but does not serve as a vehicle for upward mobility. Cultural prohibitions on
low-status work for those entering high-status professsions prevent poor
students from working part time to fund their educations, thereby limiting
altogether the access of low-income people to the university system. Here
broad social values and the lack of countervailing government policy, rather
than simple economic motivations, are contributing to the migrants' decisions
against education for their children.
LAND AND AGRICULTURE
The issues involved in expenditures on land and on agricultural improvements
are complex and must be considered in relation to each other. There has
been considerable debate on the impact of migration on agriculture. One
scenario suggests that by siphoning off surplus unskilled labor, migration will
lead to increased marginal product of land and agricultural capital. This will
encourage investment in agriculture, which is made possible by the availability
of remittances. (Paine 1974, p. 47) It is also suggested that decreased labor
supply will lead to consolidation of fragmented land holdings because the
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remaining labor must be used more efficiently. (Kindleberger 1967, pp.
103-106) In an opposing scenario, migration depletes the rural areas of skilled
labor, causing increased agricultural wages and decreases in agricultural output
and land under cultivation in response to the increased wages. Migrant
households do not invest in agriculture, but abandon it in favor of living off
remittances, since migration is more lucrative than agriculture could ever be.
Moreover the decreased agricultural output and increased cash incomes would
combine to generate increases in consumption of imported foods, with
predictable negative consequences for balance of payments, inflation, and so
on. (Paine 1974, pp. 47ff)
In analyzing economic impacts, we must separate expenditures on land
from those on capital or labor which increase its yield. Expenditures on land
alone do not constitute productive investments. Rather, they shift of existing
means of production from one owner to another. The impact this shift on
total output will depend on what the seller does with the money s/he
receives and how the buyer uses the land. Expenditures on improvements to
land, however, should clearly be viewed as productive investments, since they
generate increases in output. Thus the economist only interested in maximizing
total output would look at migrant expenditures on agricultural improvements,
but would not be interested in land purchases which did not involve any
changes in production levels or techniques. The economist who is concerned
with the distribution of income as well as its total level would be interested
in both issues.
The anthropological evidence suggests that the buying and selling of land
may be understood in ways which are not captured by the economic analysis.
Migrant behavior with respect to land may be affected by changes in
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attitudes towards manual labor; in a number of places sharecroppers feel that
migration increases their social status, and are reluctant to resume their old
occupation upon return. In some places the ownership of land -- even if it is
not cultivated -- is a mark of social status or a way of holding a place in
the home community, which motivates migrants to make purchases. Moreover,
land reform and other government policies are influencing migrant use of
land, as are larger economic shifts caused by migration itself.
Under some circumstances, land provides a viable outlet for migrant
earnings, and can be purchased in sufficient quantities to enable the returnee
to marry and support a family. This has been the case for migrants returning
to the Ilocos Norte province of the Philippines after working as contract
laborers on the Hawaiian sugar cane plantations. (McArthur, 1979 and Griffiths,
1979) Historically the Ilocano villagers have been divided between holders of
small farms and sharecroppers on a few large estates. Population pressures
dating back at least a hundred years have led the sons of smallholders to
migrate to other parts of the country, in order to leave more land for their
siblings to inherit. In 1919 the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association began
recruiting laborers for three-year contracts in the cane fields. By offering
round trip air fair to anyone completing the contract, they were able to hire
both small holders and sharecroppers, who couldn't afford to migrate within
the country.
The two studies of Ilocos Norte look at people who went to Hawaii
before the Second World War and stayed for anywhere from three to more
than forty years. The migrants planned to save enough cash to buy a farm,
which would serve as their dowry or enable them to support their families. It
seems that they were in fact able to do this. Although they could not save
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enough to buy more land than they could work themselves -- and thereby
become landlords -- they were able to be comfortably self-sufficient after
their return. Migrants who stayed overseas for longer periods of time could
build homes with their savings, and were well off enough to invest in
agricultural equipment and to take the risk of experimenting with new rice
varieties. Once the viability of new strains of rice had been demonstrated,
their use quickly spread to the other farmers who couldn't take the risk of
pioneering. Thus migration is associated with shifts in the ownership of land
as well as increases in its productivity which in time spread throughout the
community.
Interestingly, the success of these migrations from the point of view of
accomplishing the migrants' goals appears to owe something to the United
States' colonial policy in the Philippines. U.S. policies emphasized education
and political participation, which created new opportunities in politics and the
professions for the Ilocano estate owners. Consequently, at the time that the
migrants were returning to purchase land, the large landowners were interested
in selling their estates in order to fund their own ambitions to work in
Manila. Thus land was available for purchase, and this particular combination
of circumstances led to its redistribution from the landowners to the returned
migrants.
In some places, migrants purchase land to provide themselves with a
"nest egg" in the home village, but they do not rely on the income from it.
This pattern prevails on the island of St. Vincent in the West Indies.
(Rubenstein, 1979) Savings from migrant remittances are frequently put into
agricultural land which is held in the expectation that the migrant will
someday return. The family may make some effort to farm the land, but
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frequently they can live off of remittances more comfortably, and prefer to
consider farm labor below their status. Often the land is taken out of
cultivation altogether, and is used as a house plot, thereby decreasing the
total supply of agricultural land. Migrant purchases are also causing fragmentation
of land holdings, making the plots less economical to farm. Moreover, the
cash flooding the market has inflated the price of land beyond the reach of
non-migrant households interested in farming.
Brettell observes some of the patterns in northern Portugal. (Brettell,
1979) In the vilage she studied, she found that migrants disdain the peasant
life and the "dirty" work of agricultural laborers. They migrate in order to
move up the social ladder, and accordingly do not want to invest remittances
in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the construction of large houses is eating
into the supply of agricultural land, thus contributing to the erosion of the
area's traditional economic base and necessitating continued migration.
The experiences of North Yemen illustrate the problems of land price
inflation and land as a source of prestige. (Swanson, 1979 Emigration and
Economic Development) Swanson, studying three villages outside Taiz in the
southern Hijaz mountains, reports that migrants who return to their villages
are eager to buy land because it conveys power and prestige within the
traditional culture. However, the option of migrating as a way to meet
sudden cash needs means that no landholders are really hard pressed to sell.
Prices have skyrocketed as a result; between the early 1960s and the mid
1970s the cost of good agricultural land increased by a factor of ten. In
1976, Swanson reports the sale of prime irrigated land for nearly $70,000 an
acre. (p. 71)
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The land-use picture in Yemen is further complicated by larger shifts in
the economy. The increases in remittances have been accompanied by
increased demand for goods, which is generating rampant inflation. The
inflation, together with the manpower shortages caused by migration, has
caused wages to rise precipitously. All else being equal, wage increases
would provide incentives for farmers to invest in labor-saving machinery.
However, many labor saving techniques can not be applied in the Yemeni
highlands because the terraces are too narrow to permit introduction of the
available machinery.
Increased incomes have also changed the patterns of demand for
agricultural goods. Food imports have risen sharply, and they are in
competition to domestic products. At the same time, demand for qat, a
mildly narcotic leaf chewed socially by all Yemenis, has increased enormously,
as has its price. Since returns from qat have increased relative to other
products and it requires little labor, farmers are shifting from production of
food to growing the leafy bush. Oat requires the high quality irrigated land
whose prices have risen so quickly; farmers purchasing this land cannot
afford to use it for other less profitable plants. Similarly, investments in
irrigation systems require the high returns from qat in order to be profitable.
At the same time, marginal fields are being taken out of cultivation in
response to labor shortages and, as Al-Kasir (1983) reports, total outputs of
grain and export crops are dropping. The decreased viability of agriculture
(except for qat) is forcing those who haven't worked overseas to migrate to
the cities in search of work which will enable them to keep up with inflation.
Overseas migration is generating substantial increases in demand for
land. However because of increased wages and shifts in the prices of
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agricultural commodities it is not usually profitable to invest in improving its
productivity if it is not suitable for qat production. The result is broad shifts
in agricultural patterns and a spiral of interactions between migration and
changes in the rural economy.
The experiences of the Spanish village of Alcudia have in many ways
parallelled the Yemeni ones. (Rhoades, 1979, pp. 65ff) The town has relatively
good agricultural potential, especially in comparison with neighboring villages;
the land is fairly flat, the soil fertile, and access to regional markets good.
Moreover, the initial distribution of land ownership was fairly even. Consequently,
even the largest landowners lacked the power to prevent migration in order
to hold onto their supply of cheap labor. Returning migrants were eager to
buy land, the price of unirrigated land rising more than fifteenfold between
1961 and the mid 1970s. However, the plots held by most returnees are too
small to support a family. Moreover the cost of labor, driven up by the
unwillingness of migrants to do agricultural work, is too high to be covered
by the value of the produce. A number of migrants have purchased imported
tractors which they rent to others in the community; however low demand for
tractor time and high costs of maintenance and fuel meant that this market
was very quickly saturated. Other investment in new technologies to increase
farm yields has been limited. Rhoades concludes that, as in Yemen, the real
forces behind migrants' land purchases have been a desire to establish
themselves in the community and a lack of more profitable investment
opportunities.
Migration-related wage increases affect overall agricultural patterns in the
Caribbean as well. (Philpott, 1978) Migration has been an option on the island
of Monserrat for over a century, but it didn't become really important until
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transportation to Britain became easy in the 1950s. At the same time a new
political system was encouraging the growth of trade unions on the island.
With migration available as a fallback, the sharecroppers organized and were
essentially able to drive up wages enough to cause the collapse of the large
estates which had been the foundation of the island's agricultural system.
Unlike the Filippino case, however, the migrants did not then buy the land for
their own use. Instead, households receiving remittances were generally
unwilling to engage in agricultural labor. This suggests either that migration
was still more lucrative than agriculture despite the wage increases, or that
status considerations with respect to agricultural work were stronger than
economic ones. Unfortunately, Philpott does not pursue this issue, so we
cannot determine which of these -hypotheses is more likely.
The experiences of the migrants from Larestan (Iran) to Kuwait (McIntire,
1982 p. 29) suggest how government policies may interact with migrant
values about agriculture. McIntire gives several reasons why Lari migrants
chose not to invest in agricultural land in Iran. To start, government
land-reform policies restricted total holdings of a family to an amount too
small to be profitable. Moreover, national credit policies and subsidized food
imports made domestically produced food less competitive on national
markets. The problems were compounded because, as long as migration to
Kuwait was an option, it was hard to recruit laborers at an affordable price.
From the perspective of the migrants these factors "ruined" agriculture as an
economic activity. At the same time they came to view it as "regressive"
and "simple-minded," and preferred to invest in urban areas and live an urban
life. (/bid) What happened to the agricultural land when they left is unclear;
McIntire seems to suggest that it remained in the hands of former
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sharecroppers, but that they could not farm it profitably because of the
government policies which discriminated against domestic agriculture, and
higher returns available from migration.
These studies suggests several important impacts on land and agricultural
investments which are not captured by the economic analyses. Perhaps most
important are the roles of land ownership and farm labor in determining
social status in many societies. In these studies social status factors play a
significant part in migrant decisions independently of economic motivations.
They also play into and off of the local economy. For example, the values
placed on land, which influence the demand curve in ways not anticipated by
an economic perspective, interact with and in fact create significant supply
constraints in many places. This drives up land prices and thus determines
patterns of investment in agriculture. The studies also indicate the role of
government credit and food policies on the profitability of agriculture, an
issue not considered in the predictions that remittances will be invested in
agricultural equipment.
BUSINESS INVESTMENTS
Theorists about international migration often suggest that returnees will
invest their earnings in productive enterprises. Several arguments are involved
here. One is that the migration experience will develop a spirit of entrepreneurship
thought not to exist in the traditional sending communities. Another is that
migrants will learn new skills which they will be able to use profitably upon
their return. A third suggests that the bottleneck to investment has been the
availability of capital, which will be alleviated by remittances.
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Several patterns run through the anthropological data on such investments.
Many migrants try to find niches within the "traditional" economic structure
of the home community in which to open businesses. However, because these
communities are small and demand more or less fixed, the markets for the
services of migrant firms are quickly saturated under most circumstances.
This experience has been demonstrated in many places. In discussing
returnees to Alcudia (Spain), Rhoades documents migrants investing in
bar-restaurants, small grocery stores, service shops like hairdressing salons
and repair shops, and transportation services. (Rhoades, 1978 p. 142; Rhoades,
1979 p. 64) Rhoades also observes one type of enterprise which is
responding to changes in the structure of the town's economy; a few families
which had owned shops before the recent migrations sold them to returnees,
and opened lucrative furniture and appliance stores to meet the new demand
generated by remittances. The migrant businesses are in very close competition
with each other in Alcudia. Thus, for example, where the town had three bars
in 1970, by 1977 it had nine, and their owners were installing special features
like color televisions in an attempt to draw customers. Even the migrants
themselves are realizing that a town of two thousand can not support nine
bars, five grocery stores and a supermarket, six bakeries, and so on. Their
desire to open the shops nevertheless is apparently related to returnees'
resistance to resuming work in the fields. Migration is seen as a way to pull
themselves out of farm labor. If they can't accomplish this at home as
entrepreneurs, they reemigrate, and then return to live off their savings until
the next trip.
Rhoades mentions that in some cases "it has been reported that the
entrenched middle class entrepreneurs and authorities simply refuse to
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cooperate in allowing (business) permits to migrants." (Rhoades 1979, p. 64)
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this; however it suggests that the
migrants would invest their sometimes quite substantial savings in more
lucrative enterprises than small shops, but are prevented from doing so by
more established entrepreneurs who fear competition. The concentration of
migrants in a few domains, therefore, may not actually indicate the full
potential for investment in the home village to permit a self-sufficient way
of life.
The lack of opportunities for profitable investment in the home community
shows up in North Yemen as well. (Swanson, 1979 Emigration and Economic
Development pp. 73ff) Aside from the investments in land and (to a limited
extent) agricultural equipment discussed above, the principle investments in
rural areas are in milling and local transportation. However as in Alcudia,
these markets are quickly saturated. Swanson suggests that in the Yemeni
case, one limiting factor is that no individual migrant has enough capital to
invest in anything radically different, but there are no institutional mechanisms
for pooling resources to generate a significantly larger supply of capital.
In only one case, that of Yugoslavia, do we see returnees investing in
non-traditional activities in the home community. (Bennett, 1979) The national
government is promoting the Adriatic coast as a tourist area and special
legislation allows private business enterprises such as gostione (tourist homes),
restaurants, and even discos. Of fifteen large gostione in the village of
Sutivan, eight were financed with foreign earnings. Multiplier and spillover
effects from the development of tourism are being felt in other sectors of
the local economy, in increased demand for everyday goods, expansion of the
construction industry, and so on. In this case, national government policies
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changing the economic base of the region are the variable permitting
productive investment of migrant earnings in the home community.
While these studies suggest that it is the exception rather than the rule
that the home community offers opportunities for profitable investment,
several studies have shown migrants investing in larger cities after returning
from abroad. This has been the case with the Larestan migrants to Kuwait.
(McIntire, 1982, 1984) Returned Lari migrants invest primarily in urban real
estate and in wholesale or retail businesses. Those with less savings would
return from Kuwait to open businesses in Lar; however, as in other places,
competition was intense and profits low. Those with more capital, therefore,
would invest in larger Iranian cities outside the province of Larestan, in some
cases moving there permanently as they became established. For these
people, temporary migration to Kuwait becomes a route to social mobility
which involves a permanent departure from the home community.
The case of North Yemen shows a variety of migrant investments in
larger cities. (Swanson, 1979 Emigration and Economic Development pp. 81ff)
Swanson discusses several kinds of investment which migrants were making
in Taiz, San'a', and elsewhere. The favored urban investment is in buildings,
usually new structures with one or more shops at the ground floor and an
apartment above. Although this was very popular, even by the time of
Swanson's study the prices of urban land and the costs of construction had
risen enough to put it beyond the means of most returnees. A second
popular urban business was the emigrant agency; however by the mid-1970s
this market had been pretty well saturated and was very hard to break into.
Retail businesses have also been tried; however as elsewhere the competition
is intense and many firms fail. The fourth type of investment which Swanson
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observed observed was transportation. Because of growth in Yemen's road
system, the field for such investments has not yet been crowded out;
however Swanson is pessimistic about the long-run income generating
potential of these investments as well.
Swanson also observes that the only returnees making urban investments
are those who migrated not to the Gulf states, but to the Americas. He
explains this by the fact that they have more capital to invest than migrants
who stayed closer to home. If this explanation is valid, it suggests that
under most circumstances migration may not provide enough capital to permit
profitable investments in the absence of mechanisms to facilitate pooling of
resources.
Meyer and Al-Kasir have portrayed a slightly different picture of Yemeni
migrant investments in the cities. (Meyer, 1983; Al-Kasir, 1983) Meyer found
that many returnees move to San'a' to invest in the construction and building
materials industries, which have boomed due to migrant demand for housing.
In his study, about two thirds of the managers of firms producing building
materials had worked abroad, and many of these had learned their vocational
skills while away. These people dominate the production of non-traditional
materials like concrete blocks, iron gates and aluminum doors. On the other
hand, the production of traditional building elements like wooden doors is not
dominated by international migrants. This case shows clearly how changes in
consumer demand of migrant households is stimulating economic growth and,
at the same time, how migration is providing both the capital and the skills
to meet that demand. This trend is having repercussions for the rural areas
as well as for San'a'. The proprietors of these firms prefer to hire their
relatives or others from their own villages. Thus a steady stream of
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rural-urban migration has been generated as a by-product of international
migration.
Al-Kasir has found similar patterns looking at a broader sample of
businesses in San'a'. Over half of the firms he looked at had been
established by returned migrants. As in the Meyer study, these were
concentrated in new area like welding, aluminum shaping, automobile repairs,
and manufacturing cement building blocks. Again the owners tended to hire
people from their home villages. This is providing poor people from rural
areas, who lack the capital to go abroad, with opportunities to increase their
incomes within the country.
These examples suggest that migrant investment in business ventures --
like any such investments -- will be economically most productive when they
are in growing sectors of the economy. At present, however, most rural
areas do not offer many opportunities for growth, even when capital
constraints are alleviated by the availability of remittances. Where opportunities
do exist for investment they are part of larger changes in the economy -- in
some cases generated by migration -- and, as with educational opportunities,
they require the migrant to move more or less permanently out of the home
community. The Yemeni case highlights this, showing how the changes in way
of life generated by migration are drawing in groups far beyond the
international migrants themselves.
TRADITIONAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND RITUALS
In a number of places we observe migrants putting significant assets
into ceremonies or social activities which establish or raise their social
standing within their home communities. In terms of national economic
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growth this appears to be totally unproductive. However, at the local level, it
serves a variety of functions, some of which resemble investment and others
of which should be considered conspicuous consumption.
For some of the Lari migrants to Kuwait, expenditures on traditional
activities contribute to the migrant family's ability to establish itself in the
home community. (McIntire 1982) McIntire compares two readaptation paths
taken by returned migrants. The education route, discussed above, brings
returns to the migrant family through the employment of the educated
younger generation in government or education, and frequently involves
moving to a larger city. The other route is to devote funds to religious good
works such as public buildings, giving to the poor, and sponsoring religious
ceremonies. McIntire's study suggests that those who pursued the second
strategy were easily accepted by the community and, in particular, had no
trouble finding desirable spouses for their children. Those who did not
engage in traditional status activities or participate in gift giving or exchange
networks were not accepted, and she cites the case of such a man who had
to pay a very substantial dowry to obtain even a lower class bride for his
son.
Participation in traditional organizations meets an economic need for
some of the Ilocano migrants from the Philippines as well. (Griffiths 1979)
Griffiths finds that the wealth provided by migration allowed the returned
migrants to form two sociodades (sic), mutual aid societies whose members
contribute to help each other pay the costs of marriages and funerals. To
attract members, one of the sociodades sponsored a fiesta, an important event
in other parts of the Philippines, but rare in the Ilocos region because people
were too poor to afford them. A fiesta queen is elected on such occasions,
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in a contest where the votes are monetary. The girl for whom the most
money is contributed is the winner, and the money pays for the feast and
for a village project chosen by the sociodad. Traditionally, the sociodades and
the fiestas have provided an opportunity for members of the community to
express reciprocal obligations. The sponsorship and election of fiesta queens
has also become a vehicle for migrants to establish status in the home
society. Many of the queens are in fact backed by migrant funds. Some very
wealthy returnees -- the so-called pensionados, who retire in the Philippines on
American social security benefits -- would sometimes obtain a young girl as
a wife in return for sponsoring her as the fiesta queen. (McArthur, 1979) (The
girls acquiesce to such marriages because they will receive- the pension after
their husband's death, and their children will receive dependent benefits until
they are eighteen years old.) It seems, therefore, that participation in the
sociodades and the fiestas meets several needs for the migrants; it is a form
of insurance, a way of establishing a position in the society, and for some a
way of obtaining a wife.
In other places expenditures on traditional ritual are more clearly a form
of display. (Brettell 1979, pp. 5-6) Migrants to France from northern Portugal
often return in the summer to show off their new wealth. At weddings and
festivals they seek to outdo each other with lavish food and drink. If they
can't return to participate, they send contributions which also serve to
establish their place in the society. In Brettell's view, this kind of behavior is
completely characteristic of northern Portuguese migration, which she interprets
as largely motivated by a desire to improve social status in the rigid and
tightly knit home community.
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Volkman's discussion of the role of ritual among the Toraja raises more
subtle questions. (Volkman 1984) The Toraja, subsistence farmers in the South
Sulawesi highlands of Indonesia, began leaving their communities in the 1960s
to work in the forests of Kalimantan. For many, migration was a way to
fulfill a desire for wealth and status at home. This was accomplished in two
ways. First, as in many places, they returned with watches, radios, blue
jeans, and other paraphernalia of Western life. At the same time, however,
they put substantial resources into traditional status-affirming rituals. This has
caused considerable confusion, because the rituals they are performing
evolved to affirm status categories which have lost their meaning now that
anyone can become wealthy by migrating. Moreover, the rituals are part of
the indigenous belief systems of their grandparents, but most of the migrants
are themselves Christian. As these rituals flower with migrant money, they
draw an influx of tourists, which adds to the unreality of the performances.
The tourism does not stimulate the local economy enough to offer a
productive outlet for investment, nor can the rituals themselves be understood
as an investment which brings in tourist revenue. In the meantime, migrant
earnings are not put into possibly more productive investment in agriculture,
and the subsistence base of the sending community is eroding for lack of
labor.
Thus the significance of expenditures on traditional events is unclear,
perhaps even to the migrants themselves. From an economics perspective,
they do not contribute to national growth. Under some circumstances they do
provide clear benefits to the individual migrant and to his or her community.
In other cases, their most important purpose is apparently to increase status.
The Toraja case is most telling, because the expenditures on ritual point to
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the confusion within the society as it changes in response to migration and
larger pressures from the outside world.
CONCLUSIONS
Returnees from international migration may have several "assets" which
may enable them to make productive investments in their countries of origin.
Most obvious of these, of course, is money earned abroad. The second is a
desire to get away from or improve local conditions, which probably
contributed to their desire to move in the first place. The third is an increase
in their human capital; trades learned abroad, new awareness of efficient
ways of working, and so on.
These factors alone, however, are not sufficient to generate economically
productive investments upon return. This still depends on the outcome of a
rational calculus of the advantages and disadvantages of investing. This
analysis has suggested that under many circumstances this calculus will come
out negative, because the investments possible with returnees' capital are not
profitable enough to be more attractive than living off of remittances or
engaging in cyclical migration.
There are many possible interpretations of this result. We can think of
migrants' capital supplies as too small to allow investments substantial
enough to generate economies of scale. Then an appropriate response would
be to investigate mechanisms to pool these resources, for example by
developing financial institutions in the rural areas.
Alternately, we could understand the issue to be the lack of investment
opportunities for returned migrants. In a sense this is not different from the
first formulation, but it shifts the locus of the "problem" from the migrants
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to the society. In so doing, this formulation suggests several explanations for
the outcome of the cost-benefit calculus. We may ask whether any sectors
of the sending country's economy are growing and, if so, where they are. In
some places -- particularly Yemen -- most economic growth is occurring in
the cities, and we observe migrants moving to take advantage of it. In a few
places -- such as Yugoslavia and the Philippines -- there are opportunities in
the rural areas, and migrants are heavily represented.
However, in many countries there either is no growth or the migrants
are not participating in it. For instance, if, as Rhoades suggests, the rural
situation in Alcudia resembles the Yemeni one, why don't we observe
Alcudian returnees investing in large cities? This raises the possibility that
investment opportunities do not exist because of characteristics of the larger
economy, but are generated by the migrants themselves. The question then is
why only some migrants seek out or create investments. This could depend
on the migration pattern. In places where migration has existed for a long
time and may be expected to continue, remittances constitute a secure
livelihood for the family, which may therefore have no incentive to invest at
home. Where migration is a more recent phenomenon, more precarious
politically, or where the migrants are not permitted to stay in the host
country for a long time -- all of which describe the Yemeni experience in the
Gulf -- they may have more incentive to invest at home since they can not
count on remittances for support in the long run.
The anthropological evidence shows that conventional economic consider-
ations may not be the determining ones in decisions about where or whether
to invest. This is the case with respect to land, which conveys social status
in many communities even though it is not providing a means of livelihood.
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The biases against agricultural labor have the reverse effect, keeping many
migrants from returning permanently lest they be forced to resume work in
the fields. Expenditures on ritual show similar non-economic priorities in the
calculus; the status conveyed is more important than financial returns from
investment.
The evidence also shows many ways in which government policies can
play into the investment calculus. This was important in Larestan, both in the
government provision of education which generated an alternative to migration
and in the food, credit, and land tenure policies which made agricultural
investment unprofitable. In Yugoslavia government policies worked to encourage
rather than discourage investment in rural areas, by stimulating the tourist
industry on the Adriatic coast. The Ilocano case shows how policies which
were apparently altogether unrelated to labor migration affected the supply
side of the land market to make investments in land and agriculture
profitable.
The anthropological perspective draws our attention to a range of
factors playing into decisions about investment of migrants' earnings which
are not allowed for in economic analyses of the impacts of migration. As
this discussion has shown, if we want to understand whether or why
remittances are actually contributing to national growth in any particular
country, we must expand our analysis to include these variables, rather than
trying to answer our questions in economic terms alone.
ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This discussion raises a number of other issues in the study of
migration and remittances which warrant attention in further research. Some
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of these fit within the general framework we have implicitly used, which
seeks to explain the use of remittances in terms of economic opportunities,
characteristics of the sending communities, and government policy. Others
question that framework, and go beyond the study of migration to problems
which underly all social science research.
One important question is whether we should expect remittances to be
used differently from any other income. To the extent that they have been
treated differently, it is because researchers are framing their questions in
terms of the effects of migration rather than household use of income.
However, it is not at all clear that the fact that money is sent by a relative
working abroad should affect its use. If it does not, then remittances should
be discussed within the context of a general discussion of the uses of
increased income, which has been analyzed by economists and other social
scientists. In their analysis, an important issue is whether income is available
regularly and in predictable amounts, or in unexpected windfalls. This will be
particularly relevant to the remittance discussion, since migrants vary greatly
in ther regularity of their remittances.
A major determinant of the predictability of remittances may be whether
the migration is for contract labor or to look for work. By and large
migrants on contracts will expect to return at a definite time, and their
savings from foreign earnings (whether remitted or held to bring back upon
return) may reflect an orientation towards using the money at home. By
contrast, migrants who go for an indefinite period, and possibly do not
expect to return, may have a quite different attitude towards using their
earnings to support those at home. For example, they might send money
home regularly at first, but as their ties weaken their remittances may
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become more sporadic. It would, therefore, e useful to compare the behavior
of contract laborers and their families with that of long-term migrants.
Another issue of some importance is who decides how and for whom
migrant earnings are to be used--the migrant, or his or her immediate or
extended family. This is related to the broader question of whether migration
is an individual strategy for advancement or a part of a larger household
strategy. Economists have tended to treat the migrant as an individual
operating only in the context of his or her own interests. Recently, it has
become apparent that in many places this is not the case, but that the
decision to send a migrant is part of a household strategy to increase or
diversify its income or opportunities. To some extent we can guess at the
consequences of this distinction--for example, migrants who operate on their
own may send less remittances or have more say in their use than those
sent by their families. However, this distinction should be understood more
broadly, as a determinant of the whole migration pattern which should inform
any investigation of migrant behavior.
Several broader concerns have also arisen from this work. The approach
taken throughout has been implicitly dualist, in the sense that the orientation
has always been "the home community" versus "elsewhere," where "elsewhere"
may be the place to which the migrant goes initially or a third place where
s/he goes after "return." It may be more appropriate to think about the
location and movement of people in terms of a network of places and social
ties. One individual may have most of his or her ties in a single place--the
"home community"--but also have relatives or friends in a number of other
places. In deciding where to work or where to use available resources s/he
may think in terms of all of these places, moving among them in different
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patterns to meet different needs. What could appear to be a one-time move,
or a move followed by return to the place of origin, may really be part of a
more complicated pattern. By reducing migration to simple two-node movements,
we may be missing much of what is going on and misunderstanding what is
motivating the behavior we observe. In a sense, this makes "migration" and
"remittances" inappropriate concepts; what we are really interested in is how
people incorporate spatial distance and mobility into their strategies for
earning and spending money. This does not so much provide a new topic for
research as it provides a different framework for studying the same broad
topics as we have been considering all along.
An even broader problem which arises from this work pertains to the
relation between theory and reality in the social sciences. This is something
of a chicken-and-egg problem; are theoretical generalizations derived from
empirical observation, or is empirical work done to test abstractly generated
theories? The economics approach to migration takes the latter view,
constructing abstract models which may be tested against statistical data to
be "proven" or "disproven." The anthropological studies which we have
considered take the empirical experiences as a starting point, and engage in
an interactive process of developing hypotheses or interpretations, using them
to interpret the "real world," and using the real world to suggest additional
hypotheses.
On one level, we could choose between these approaches based on an a
priori belief about whether there exist abstract, "right" theories which, if
sufficiently refined, would enable us to predict the behavior of individuals. If
we believe such theories to exist, then we should follow the analytical
methods of eonomics; otherwise we should follow those of anthropology.
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On another level, we may want to choose an approach based not on a
philosophical belief about which is right, but on the purpose to which we will
put our research. For some policy purposes, it is important to be able to
predict values of specific variables, for example remittances or investment in
particular sectors of the economy. If this is our goal, then our concern is
with accurate prediction and we need only as complete an understanding of
the process by which the variable is determined as will give us our values.
We may, on the other hand, be broadly concerned about the problems of the
families of migrants from a particular region. To determine what a local
government could do to help them, we will want to understand their situation
as fully as possible in order to assess what the problems are, but we will
have no use for abstract models which predict their actions. The interpretive
approach will be much more valuable here, because it has more potential to
provide the kind of information which will meet our needs.
This examination of anthropological studies on migration raises at least
as many questions as it answers, both about migration itself and about ways
of thinking about social science research. These questions are in themselves
a useful result. In searching for ways to modify the approaches of
neoclassical thinking, we expected to suggest possiblities, but not necessarily
to produce a complete analytical framework.
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